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Abstract 
In its aim to explore some of the concrete consequences of regional renewal, this paper deals 
with the question to what extent dramatic structural transformation and renewal in Swedish 
regions is paralleled by favourable developments of household income, employment growth 
and value added total growth. We stud ied the period 1978 to 2004, building on previous 
research concerning the regional consequences of the dramatic technology-shift process that 
has been taking place in Sweden. Long-term changes in the relationships between Swedish 
regions are analysed by establishing conceptual connections between regional long-term 
economic transformation and welfare. It is argued that there are time- lags as well as systemic 
spatial asymmetries when it comes to technology- induced restructuring, overall regional 
economic growth, employment creation, and income growth. We used data from the DEVIL 
(Databases of Evolutionary Economic Geography in Lund) combined with additional data sets 
from Statistics Sweden.  
 3 
Introduction 
 
Economic renewal and transformation: some unanswered questions  
This paper deals with the connection between regional economic transformation/renewal and 
welfare creation. Our interest in this research field is spurred by two sets of questions.  
 
Firstly, previous research efforts have revealed an increasing divergence in the Swedish 
regional system during the 1980s and 1990s (measured in production and productivity), 
accompanied by substantial aggregate growth in produced volumes and labour produc tivity 
(Svensson Henning, 2006; Lundquist, Olander, and Svensson Henning, 2005, 2008). Even if 
it might be argued that this divergence is an expected temporal phenomenon in times of 
dramatic economic transformation (i.e. that regional transformation is characterised by 
substantial time- lag effects within a regional system), it is an intriguing question if the 
transformation and growth at a national level in Sweden has been accompanied by economic 
welfare increases in all regions, or if the national transformation process is systematically 
benefiting some regions at the expense of others, which then ‘pay’ for the transformation 
process. 
 
Secondly, there is the controversy regarding claimed processes of ‘jobless growth’ that 
characterised many contemporary economies during the 1990s.1  According to the thesis, the 
old established connection between aggregate or productivity growth and quantitative 
employment change is replaced by a situation where aggregated growth (in volume or 
productivity) is to an increasing extent taking place without growth in employment 
opportunities. Such a situation could theoretically be explained by increases in labour 
productivity overshadowing increases in demand. The jobless growth thesis is a contested 
one, but has figured in the Swedish national economic debate for quite some time. But why 
some argue that the jobless growth is an effect of the rigid Swedish labour market, others 
question the thesis at large. For the moment, the last opinion is gaining ground due to the 
improving national labour market situation. However, the question whether we are stuck in a 
more or less job- less growth, nationally and permanently, can not been fully answered until 
national development is considered the aggregated outcome of regions starting their growth or 
                                                 
1 For a discussion about productivity change and jobless growth, see Andersson (2006). 
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decline at various points of time during a national technology shift process. Therefore, the 
answer to the question may depend on the time period studied.  
 
With this paper, we hope to contribute to a more insightful debate on the regional benefits and 
cost of national economic transformation and, although being proponents of the necessary 
structural transformation of economies, avoid naïve interpretations on the regional aspects of 
economic change. We will therefore try to measure and assess the importance of 
Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ on a regional level. 
 
The writings of the early Schumpeter (for example Schumpeter, 1951, 1939) have inspired the 
development of an extensive neo-schumpeterian literature on innovation, economic change 
and growth, especially within the various stances of evolutionary economic thinking (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Fagerberg, 2003; Saviotti, 2001; Nelson, 2006; Freeman and Lourça, 
2001). In recent years, the broad evolutionary framework has also diffused into the core 
discussion of other disciplines, such as economic geography (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; 
Boschma, 2004; Frenken et al., 2004). Within more non-formalised stances (‘appreciative,’ 
Nelson and Winter, 1982) also subscribing to the basic theoretical suggestions posed by 
evolutionary economic theory, several scholars have discussed the occurrence of paradigms or 
structural periods of economic development and change, defining the main cognitive ‘search 
area’ of innovations and innovation implementation in the firm. These paradigms are often 
dominated by a defining key innovation, some may call it the pervasive impact of ‘general 
purpose technologies’2, and accompanied by new structures of relative prices (Dosi, 1988; 
Freeman and Perez, 1988; Schön, 2000). Sometimes the dominating forces of growth are 
theoretically associated with the co-development of dominant technologies and their 
complementarities, institutional structures and organisational structures (Schön, 2000).  
 
In Swedish economics and economic history, structural research has had a long and vibrant 
tradition, mainly within the framework of the Swedish growth school (Erixon, 2005). More 
specifically, the works by Lennart Schön (Schön, 2000, 2006) formulate the ‘technology shift’ 
thesis, which forms the basic framework of this paper. By quantitative analysis of aggregated 
time series (among others investment, capital/labour quotas and productivity) as well as more 
qualitatively oriented evidence, Schön has identified reoccurring phases of development in the 
                                                 
2 The concept of general purpose technologies was used earlier (if not invented) by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 
(1995). 
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Swedish economy with similar characteristics in terms of investments, technology diffusion, 
systematic lag effects between industry and institutional structures, forge-ahead and lagging 
industries, pre- and post-crises behaviour among actors and distribution of wage/profit quotas. 
Within each reoccurring period (technology shift) of about fifty years, development is 
characterised by the stylized sequence of transformation – rationalisation – crisis. Schön’s 
theories relate to the ‘development block’ thesis formulated by the Swedish economist Erik 
Dahmén in the 1940s and 1950s (Dahmén, 1950, 1988). By this, Schön provides explanations 
for the growth and demise of industries over time in a national production system and since 
the initiation of industrial capitalism, as well as to the dynamics of macro-economic crises and 
fluctuations in wage/labour quotas.  
 
Each defined technology shift period has its own logic in terms of inherent causality between 
innovation diffusion, institutional change, change in productivity and volume, and relative 
factor prices. The thesis therefore questions the standard theories regarding economic 
evolution as a continuous process characterised by gradual transformation, where technology 
is often regarded as an exogenous factor of change and where movements towards 
equilibrium and convergence can be seen as normal states of transformation. Schön (2006) 
has shown the merits of the approach and convincingly argued for the causality behind the 
scientific logic. However, when it comes to the regional dimensions and the regional welfare 
aspects of economic long-term transformation, the technology shift thesis is in need of 
qualification. For example, previous research contributions have identified the ‘regional 
receiver and development competence’, which is assumed to determine the ability of a region 
to absorb, implement and commercially translate the growth forces of the technology shift 
(process and product innovation), based on different types of externalities (Lundquist and 
Olander, 2001; Svensson Henning, 2006; see also Karlsson and Nilsson, 2002). This 
competence varies in different parts of the regional hierarchy and should give rise to lead- lag 
relationships between regions in different stages of the technology shift process. But even if 
the research tradition about regional hierarchies or systems also goes back to theorists such as 
Lösch and Christaller (see Pred, 1973), more detailed studies remain to test and verify the 
nature, reasons and system behind regional lead-lag relationships. Therefore, the questions we 
pose in this paper have so far largely been left unanswered in the contemporary literature. 
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Aim and research questions  
The aim of this paper is to, from reading the literature, empirically investigate whether there 
are time lags between regions in economic transformation and diffusion of growth within a 
regional system, and if regional economic transformation and growth is associated with 
increases in economic welfare (employment and household income) at a regional level. We 
aim to investigate the case for Sweden during the years 1978 to 2004, using a systemic 
regional approach where regions, on the basis of size, are divided into six classes (tiers). The 
following research questions are posed in the paper: 
 
· Are there identifiable time lags in economic transformation/renewal between regions 
in the Swedish regional system during the period studied? 
· Is there a relationship between regional economic transformation, on the one hand and 
regional aggregated growth, employment, and household income on the other?  
 
From theory to method  
Our assumptions derived from the literature are that general purpose technologies define main 
characteristics of economic transformation, renewal and growth during a technology shift 
process. These technologies create growth in new industries and revitalise older parts of the 
economy through productivity increases and lower costs. By definition, they affect almost the 
entire economy and open up to the growth of technological complementarities, defining new 
contexts for older and more mature technologies. We also assume that the impact on different 
industries and sectors are differentiated in various scale, but also at different points in time 
(Perez 1983). This would give growth patterns their cyclical characteristics during the period. 
Industry-specific technologies are assumed to exert minor influence in this context. These will 
not define the character of the growth trajectories over the whole period, but create only 
variations which arise between national as well as regional economies. It is of course a huge 
task to try to measure the direct and indirect effects of general-purpose technologies on 
growth, productivity, and investment for all industries in an economy, and to sort these effects 
out from all other influences. This is not our purpose. What we wish to achieve is to show that 
the traces of the technology shift are made clear to the extent that they cannot be neglected. 
We argue that they must be taken into account, especially when it comes to issues of regional 
development. We hope to inspire further research in this tradition. 
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How are we then to proceed to make it probable that we see the effects of the technology 
shift? Our point of departure is the technology shift thesis by Schön (2000; 2006) and the 
aggregate data that support his discussion. The time period during which the present 
technology shift takes place is derived from this literature, or rather, the first part of this shift 
that the Swedish economy has passed through so far. Schön’s results encouraged us to define 
hypothetical and stylized combinations of growth and productivity trajectories to which 
characteristics of price-volume development must be added for this period. These are assumed 
to correspond to industries playing different roles in the technology shift process. Industries 
producing key inputs for new products associated with new GPT would for example show 
combinations of trajectories and price-volume changes differentiated from those of industries 
with other roles to play. These could for instance be early or late adopters of the new 
technologies, industries that serve as demand-driven suppliers to technology-driven industries, 
consumer goods industries driven by real wage increases, or industries that are not affected at 
all. The challenge is then to sort actual industries into these hypothetical and stylized 
combinations in order to reveal undercurrents of aggregate transformation. Therefore, there is 
a need to analyse the characteristics of actual industry growth curves during sub-periods of 
the technology shift period, not only growth between years defining the limits of the period. 
The technology shift thesis also makes it necessary to analyse the characteristics of actual 
industry productivity growth curves during the same sub-periods. Additionally, these different 
volume- and productivity growth curves with their combinations of sub period characteristics 
are also connected to the development of relative prices in relation to the development of 
relative volumes within industries during the whole period. Four ideal market situations come 
out from combining conceivable relative price and relative volume development on markets 
over time:  market push (growth by strong innovation implementation or marketing), market 
pressure (increasing competition from product and process improvements), market pull 
(induced effects from growth/demise of other industries), and market contraction 
(increasingly obsolete manufacturing). The four market situations, derived from literature in 
the field (Dahmén 1950; Josefsson and Örtengren 1980; Ljungberg 1990), can be used to 
determine whether industries have been relatively supply-driven or demand-driven during a 
time period. This facilitates the interpretation of industry roles during the process.  
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Method 
Thus, the joining of theory conceived volume- and productivity-growth characteristics with 
the four market situations make us create theoretically informed stylized industry groups, each 
assumed to have a different role to play during the technology shift process. 170 
manufacturing industries are then to be put into these groups using consistent time series data 
for the years 1978 to 2004. This procedure consists of four stages3. The first stage entails 
identification of industry groups exhibiting similarities in their growth of value added in 
different temporal phases of the investment cycle. The second stage divides these industry 
groups into sub-groups based on similarities in their growth of labour productivity in the same 
temporal phases. A matrix is constructed with cells corresponding to various combinations of 
growth and productivity characteristics over time, each cell containing a number of industries. 
The three first stages are explorative.  In the third stage, relative price and relative volume 
development for industries is used to distinguish between those within the cells/sub-groups 
that could be assumed to be more supply-driven in their development and those that could be 
assumed to be more demand-driven. Thus the matrix is doubled and the exploration is 
finished. In the fourth stage the theoretically stylized industry groups are linked to those 
matrix cells that contain actual industries. Once the stylized groups are filled with cell 
inhabitants, i.e. actual industries, they are called actor industries, reflecting their assumed  
 
 
Figure 1. Classification of actor industries (manufacturing sector). 
 
                                                 
3 More on data and methods can be found in working papers (Lundquist, Olander, and Svensson Henning, 2005, 
2006), also downloadable on the internet (reference list). 
Market expansion 
 
             1) Renewed         5) Induced I 
             2) Transformed          6) Induced II 
             3) Early followers          7) Contracting 
             4) Late followers          8) Obsolete I 
                   9) Obsolete I                 
                            
      Market stagnation 
Supply driven    Demand driven 
actor industries   actor industries 
· Hypothetical and stylized growth and productivity trajectories 
· Inserting of actual industries through growth and productivity 
characteristics  
· Final classification through price and volume development 
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roles in the technology shift process. The different actor industries represent a sliding scale 
from ‘supply driven’ to ‘demand driven’ and from ‘market expansion’ to ‘market stagnation’. 
From this point on actor industries can be studied. Aggregated growth can thereby be 
dismantled and followed for industry groups affected by the technology shift in various ways. 
This classification will be used as a guide for selection of those manufacturing industries that 
could be used as indicators of the economic transformation, when it comes to estimate the 
impact on economic welfare later on. 
 
For the service sector, we had to proceed according to quite a different logic. At a first stage, 
data created in the effort of constructing consistent time series (restricted to 1985-2004) were 
sorted into three groups based mainly on user orientation. In a second stage we divided these 
user-oriented groups into two sub-groups: ‘strong to medium growth’; and ‘medium to weak 
growth’, based mainly on value added development, but controlling for productivity 
development. Since no relative price series are yet available for service industries, covering  
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of service industries. 
 
· Groups of services according to market and user orientation 
· Division of services groups through growth characteristic 
· Final classification into supply and demand driven groups based 
on temporal growth variations.  
Strong to medium growth  Medium to weak growth 
service industries  service industries 
 
Producer services  
       Supply driven   Demand driven 
 
      1) ICT services                 5) Financial and legal services 
      2) Advertising, design and               6) Technical and engineering 
           other consultancy                          consultancy 
      3) R&D laboratories                 7) Leasing of man. equipment 
      4) Security services                8) Industry -related wholesale 
     
Consumer and general services 
Mainly demand driven 
 
1) Cleaning and sanitation                    7) Other retail 
2) Cons. related wholesale                    8) Vehicle trade and maint. 
3) Restaurants and hotels                    9) Communication, postal s. 
4) Retail/occasional products                    10) Construction 
5) Recreation and cultural s.                  11) Other consumer services 
6) Food retail                     12) Dept stores/hypermarkets 
                      13) Electricity, gas, water 
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our time period, service industries within the sub-groups could not be classified into supply-
driven and demand-driven following the price/volume rationale. The growth rates and the 
temporal features of different service industries in combination with productivity 
development decide together with product/market characteristics if the industry should be 
classified as supply-driven or demand-driven. As for manufacturing industries, the 
classification method used for the service sector will guide a selection of service industries 
that will be used as indicators of the transformation later on. 
 
A national picture 
It has been shown that the actor industries within manufacturing and services display 
heterogeneous characteristics not only in terms of growth trajectories, labour productivity 
development, and price/volume development, but also in terms of anticipated economic 
behaviour like R&D investments, patents, and investments in fixed assets and production 
capacities over time (Lundquist, et al., 2005, 2006, 2008). All these characteristics fit well 
with what could be expected from the technology shift thesis concerning affected industries 
and their various roles during the first investment cycle (Schön, 2000, 2006). In general and 
aggregated terms the Swedish economy following these studies has been characterised by 
dramatic shifts from severe downswings and crisis to dramatic expansion periods during the 
last thirty years. The period studied, 1978 to 2004, is called the first investment cycle of the 
current technology shift process, and commences with a severe crisis (1975/1980). However, 
the late 1970s were not just a time of crisis but also the starting point of the 
renewal/transformation phase of the new structural cycle. Growth rate therefore began to 
increase during the 1980s and was followed by a short crisis (1990/1993) where the last 
reminiscences of the former cycle were definitely shaken out. From then on growth increased 
even more during the 1990s, interrupted by a temporary downswing around the millennium 
shift. Evidence suggests an interpretation where the 2000 downswing is regarded as the 
transformation crisis of the first half of the structural cycle. This kind of crisis is the result of 
hectic growth, in the end causing frivolous entrepreneurship, over investment, and sometimes 
bottlenecks in production. Once the crisis is mastered, the economy will run more smoothly 
and a second investment cycle will most probably commence consisting of a 
rationalisation/culmination phase of ten to fifteen years. Growth is therefore expected to 
culminate in the years to come, but will, according to the technology shift thesis, decrease and 
end in a new crisis reminiscent of the one in the late 1970s. 
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Figure 3. Most salient supply and demand driven industries. 
 
Based on detailed findings from these earlier studies, our account in this paper has to be 
simplified, in order to convey a broad-brush message about transformation, at the same time 
as the societal effects in terms of development in employment and income are highlighted. It 
is necessary to select only some actor industries from manufacturing and services and use 
them as indicators. Our choice is to select the ones that have grown faster than the economy 
as a whole during the period studied. These are selected from both manufacturing and 
services, and from both the supply- and demand-driven categories. Figure 3 displays which 
industries represent the most forceful development among the supply- and demand-driven 
industries, respectively (hence called ‘most salient supply-driven and demand-driven 
industries’). Only the most prominent and marked industries from either the supply or the 
demand side are selected and indicated as driving the transformation. Industries not included 
in the figure are summarized as ‘other’ during the rest of the paper.  
 
National growth during the first investment cycle is summarized in Figure 4, using selected 
industries. Despite simplifications made, the main characteristics of the development, as 
displayed in earlier studies, are still indicated in the graphical representation. Supply- or 
technology-driven industries were, for example, growing very early in the investment cycle. 
Already during the second half of the 1980s, growth was increasing faster than for other 
industries. After the crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, growth accelerated further and 
reached its first peak around the year 2000. Growth was at a standstill during the so-called 
transformation crisis, but then accelerated three years later. The most salient demand-driven  
Supply driven   Demand driven 
(Strong national growth  (Strong national growth 
industries)   industries) 
  
 
1. Induced (I) (manufacturing 
industries)  
2. Financial and legal services 
3. Technical and engineering 
consultancy 
4. Leasing of man. equipment 
5. Industry-related wholesale 
6. Cleaning and sanitation 
7. Consumer-related wholesale 
8. Retail/occasional products  
9. Restaurants and hotels  
 
 
1. Renewed  (manufacturing 
industries) 
2. ICT services 
3. Advertising, marketing, other 
consultancy 
4. R&D laboratories 
5. Security services  
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Figure 4. Growth index 1985-2004 of most salient supply driven and demand driven 
industries. Other industries for comparison. 
 
industries could not keep up with the technology-driven industries in terms of growth, but 
grew faster than the rest of the market economy during the second half of the 1980s. The main 
effects of the technology shift on demand-driven industries however emerge much later. Not 
until a couple of years before the millennium shift did growth rates slowly begin to increase. 
Other industries grew at a slow and steady pace, so far only slightly and indirectly affected by 
the technology shift process.  
 
Table 1 accounts for the growth of the same salient industries during different time periods 
and their shares of the market economy (i.e. public sector excluded) at different points in 
time. Supply-driven industries have grown almost four times as fast as the aggregate economy 
during the period. Growth rate peaked in the first period (1985-1994), mainly because the 
growth base was very small. Absolute growth, however, was higher during the second time 
period (1994-2004). In all, the shares of the supply-driven industries tripled during the period. 
But also the demand-driven industries grew faster than the economy as a whole. However, 
their shares increased by only a few percentage units. Other industries grew very slowly and 
decreased their shares with almost twenty percentage units. Industries that have been leading 
the transformation, on the supply, as well as on the demand side, have thus increased from  
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Table 1. Growth in value added in most salient supply driven and demand driven industries 
1985-2004. Other industries for comparison. 
 
Growth in value added  
(%)  
Shares of total value added in market 
economy  
 1985-1994 1994-2004 1985-2004 1985 1994 2004 
Supply driven industries 239 143 725 7,9 13,7 21,7 
Demand driven industries  128 59 264 21,3 24,9 25,7 
Other industries 70 32 123 70,8 61,4 52,6 
Total 95 54 201 100 100 100 
Absolute figures 403580936 445848820 849429755 422971126 826552062 1272400882 
 
Table 2. Employment in most salient supply driven and demand driven industries 1985-2004. 
Other industries for comparison. 
 
Growth in employment 
(%)  
Shares of  total employment in market 
economy  
 1985-1994 1994-2004 1985-2004 1985 1994 2004 
Supply driven industries 42 90 170 7,7 11,5 18,8 
Demand driven industries  10 20 32 22,7 26,2 27,1 
Other industries -14 1 -14 69,5 62,3 54,1 
Total -4 16 11 100 100 100 
Absolute figures -87048 300564 213516 1935077 1848029 2148593 
 
one fourth to almost half of the market economy during the first investment cycle, now 
reaching its end. Drawing lessons from previous technology shifts, it could be expected that 
as the rationalization phase of the second investment cycle commences, a strong growth will 
characterise both supply- and demand-driven industries. Increased real wages and increased 
demand will also affect growth of other industries in a favourable direction in the coming 
years. 
 
Table 2 shows that volume growth preceded employment increase on a national level. The 
supply- as well as the demand-driven industries increased their employment during the first 
time period when the employment in the whole market economy was decreasing, thereby 
giving support to the national job- less growth thesis. The most powerful increase occurred in 
the second period. Other industries have not yet contributed to any major increase in 
employment. The most salient supply- and demand-driven industries therefore accounted for 
nearly all of the increase in employment in the country during the second period, but this is 
also true for the whole of the period studied. The coming period will probably be 
characterised by the increase of employment in the whole economy, until the next severe 
structural crisis. Undoubtedly, almost the whole of the market economy will, in the coming 
years, contribute to the creation of new employment.  
 14 
A systemic approach to regional development 
A central issue in this paper is whether the transformation, growth and employment change 
that have been analysed on an aggregated national level has occurred simultaneously in all 
regions in the Swedish system. There are strong theoretical reasons for assuming that this has 
not been the case. A few reasons will be mentioned, but not further developed here. The GPT 
will for instance take their time to diffuse from “the new economy” to “the old economy” due 
to regional variation in receiver and development competence. Moreover, new products and 
processes will be decomposed over time and localised to plants scattered over many regions. 
Finally, supply-driven and demand-driven production of various age will not growth 
simultaneously from the same regions.4  
 
In the following analysis, a systemic approach will be applied, where focus will be set on how 
regional development at different levels of the regional hierarchy relate to the national 
development and to each other. This means that the national development discussed earlier is 
used as a norm to benchmark the development of different regional groups. In the analysis, 
the seventy Swedish ‘A-regions’ (labour market regions) have been categorized into six 
groups based on regional size (population).5 These groups are assumed to broadly reflect in-
group coherence in receiver and development competence, and therefore also pinpoint the 
roles of regions in the system (Table 3). The core of the analysis will be the two main forces 
of the technology shift already discussed: the primary supply and technology effect, and the 
secondary or induced demand effect.  
 
Table 3. The Swedish regional system 
 
Mean 
Population 
Number of 
regions 
Mean 
z-value 
1st tier (Stockholm) 1536095 1 7,10558 
2nd tier (Göteborg) 744927 1 3,13739 
3rd tier (Malmö/Lund) 457919 1 1,69787 
4th tier (Big city regions) 156745 15 0,18730 
5th tier (Mid-sized regions) 90253 20 -0,14620 
6th tier (Small regions) 45717 32 -0,36957 
 
 
                                                 
4 The theoretical frame and detailed empirical evidence of how and when the basic actor industries, from which 
the most salient supply-driven and demand-driven industries are aggregated in this paper, start to grow and 
diffuse in the regional system is provided in Lundquist et al. (2006, 2008). 
5 The regional taxonomy is based on threshold values in size of regional population, identified via z-scores. 
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Table 4. Regional growth rates and share of value added in most salient supply driven and 
demand driven industries 1985-2004. Other industries in comparison. 
 Growth in value added (%) 
Regional shares of total national 
value added in the industries 
 1st tier  1985-1994 1994-2004 1985-2004 1985 1994 2004 
Supply driven industries 325 140 922 35 43 43 
Demand driven industries 107 140 248 32 29 31 
Other industries 74 42 147 18 18 19 
Total 115 74 275 22 24 27 
2nd tier       
Supply driven industries 220 288 1142 8 8 12 
Demand driven industries 127 288 281 12 12 12 
Other industries 68 50 152 10 10 11 
Total 92 80 245 10 10 12 
3rd tier       
Supply driven industries 317 142 910 5 6 6 
Demand driven industries 142 142 292 7 7 8 
Other industries 55 39 115 6 5 6 
Total 92 60 207 6 6 6 
4th tier      
Supply driven industries 208 138 635 23 21 21 
Demand driven industries 144 138 289 24 25 25 
Other industries 70 27 116 29 29 28 
Total 93 46 183 27 27 26 
5th tier      
Supply driven industries 163 124 491 17 13 12 
Demand driven industries 143 124 252 16 17 15 
Other industries 70 27 117 21 21 21 
Total 89 40 165 20 19 17 
6th tier       
Supply driven industries 145 74 327 12 9 6 
Demand driven industries 128 74 230 9 9 8 
Other industries 69 22 106 16 16 15 
Total 82 30 138 15 14 11 
 
Table 4 gives a first indication that regions on different levels of the regional system have 
been affected by the technology shift in varying ways. For example, growth patterns of the 
most salient supply- and technology-driven industries display obvious geographical 
(hierarchical) and temporal patterns. Growth in these industries was initialized and led 
primarily by the first tier region in the system. Later, a growth diffusion process took place, 
causing second and third tier regions to strengthen their positions in the supply-driven 
industries. Especially interesting is the dominant position that the first tier region already had 
in 1985, and that this was further consolidated during the period studied (1985-2004). All 
groups at lower levels of the regional hierarchy display a significantly lower growth rate 
during the period as a who le. Above all, this was the case for the sixth tier regions, those in 
the bottom end of the hierarchy. The renewal impulses induced by the technology shift have 
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thus primarily generated strong growth effects in the three top levels of the regional hierarchy, 
which leads to a diverging development in the regional system during the period as a whole. 
At the same time, it was noted that the difference in growth rates between different levels in 
the regional hierarchy diminishes during the second half of the period (1994-2004), which 
probably indicates the start of a ‘catch up period’ for regions just below the top of the regional 
hierarchy.  
 
This first inspection of the regional data points to the fact that there are important regional 
differences in the ways growth forces of the technology shift are manifested geographically 
and temporally. In the following, these regional sequences are considered in more detail, as 
are the consequences of the development to different levels in the regional system.  
 
Supply- or demand-driven regional transformation? 
We now address the issue to what extent regions on different levels of the regional hierarchy 
have been characterised by differences in supply- or demand-driven transformation, and the 
nature of the relationship between these two forces. Figure 5 displays the position of the 
regions compared to the county as a whole and to each other during the whole period studied 
(1985-2004). A visual inspection of the graph shows that first, second and third tier regions 
were characterised by a considerably stronger growth rate in supply-driven industries than the 
country as a whole. The differences between these top regions and lower tier regions are 
obvious, indicating that the supply-driven transformation primarily could be cons idered as a 
top-hierarchy phenomenon.  It is also apparent that the regional variation in growth rates was 
more extensive in the supply-driven part of the economy than in the demand-driven. The first 
tier region showed a lower growth rate in demand-driven industries than the country as a 
whole, but a stronger growth in the supply-driven industries. The second and third tier regions 
displayed a stronger development in both dimensions than the country as a whole. Fourth tier 
regional transformation was generally fuelled by demand-driven change, while the supply 
side growth was below national average. Fifth and sixth tier regions end up with low growth 
rates in both dimensions, indicating that they are only to a marginal extent able to draw on (or 
contribute to) the national transformation process. 
 
As shown in Table 5, there are important time lags in terms of when the different growth 
forces reach and induce change in the different regional tiers. The supply-driven growth of the 
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Figure 5. Relation between growth rates in value added in most salient supply driven 
respectively demand driven industries in different tiers of regions 1985-2004. 
 Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson): 0,600. 
 
first tier region was considerably stronger during the period 1985 to 1994 than for the period 
1994 to 2004. In the later period, transformation was shifted to demand-driven industries 
instead. The transformation process in the top of the hierarchy is therefore, with time, 
characterised increasingly by induced or secondary growth forces. The same relationship 
applies to the third tier region. For the second tier region the development is quite the 
opposite, as the supply-driven growth starts later and not until the period 1994 to 2004 at full 
force. This indicates that there has been a shift from first to second tier regions in terms of  
 
Table 5. Regional growth rates in value added. Deviations from national growth rates in 
percent units. Most salient supply driven vs most salient demand driven industries 1985-1994, 
1994-2004 and 1985-2004.  
 1985-1994  1994-2004  1985-2004  
 
Supply 
driven 
Demand 
driven 
Supply 
driven 
Demand 
driven 
Supply 
driven 
Demand 
driven 
1st tier 86 -21 -3 9 197 -16 
2nd tier -19 -2 145 9 417 18 
3rd tier 78 14 -1 3 185 29 
4th tier -31 16 -5 0 -90 25 
5th tier -76 15 -19 -15 -234 -12 
6th tier -94 0 -69 -15 -398 -34 
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson) for period 1985-1994: -0,388, 1994-2004: 0,673 and 1985-2004: 0,600.  
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which region primarily drives the supply-driven growth of the national transformation 
process. It should, however, be underlined that the growth rates for the supply-driven 
economy converge between different levels of the national system during the second period 
(1994-2004). Above all, we see a catch up by the fourth tier regions. There is however 
nothing that signals a corresponding catch-up by the smallest regions, which continue to loose 
ground in the second period.  
 
In conclusion, there was a larger variation in regional growth rates for the supply-driven 
industries, than for the demand-driven ones.  The most important feature of the development 
is that the growth of the top tier regions was significantly stronger than the national average, 
while regions, arguably lacking receiver and development competence, on lower levels of the 
hierarchy tend to show a weaker growth than the national average. Furthermore, there was no 
unambiguous regional co-variation between the growth rates of the supply- and demand- 
driven industries, neither for the sub periods, nor for the period as a whole. Growth forces 
vary between different regional groups over time, but in a systemic and logical way that 
indicate different regional roles during the economic transformation process. 
 
 
Relation between regional transformation and growth 
Another important issue is how the different trajectories of supply-driven and demand-driven 
transformation affect the total regional growth in the market economy. In Figure 6, regions 
have been positioned according to growth in the supply-driven industries and the total growth 
in their market economies during the period 1985 to 2004. An almost linear relation appears 
between the two variables. The top levels of the regional hierarchy have the highest relative 
growth in the supply-driven industries for the period as a whole, in combination with a total 
economic (value added) growth clearly above national average. Below the top level, growth 
rates fall gradually in the regional system. The trajectories for fifth and sixth tier regions are 
troublesome and display a weak technological transformation in combination with low 
aggregate growth rates. For the first tier region, the strong growth is based on a superior 
supply-driven growth during the first period (Table 6). In most of the regional system, supply-  
driven growth has not ye t started or is not strong enough to compensate for the phasing out of 
older activities in the wake on the technology shift. This means that the positive effects of the 
technology shift initially only benefit regional groups in the top of the hierarchy, while the 
 19 
60,030,00,0-30,0-60,0
Valueadded85_04
500,0
250,0
0,0
-250,0
S
up
pl
y8
5_
04
Sweden
6'th tier
5'th tier
4'th tier
3'rd tier
2'nd tier
1'st tier
 
Figure 6. Relation between growth rates in value added in most salient supply driven 
industries respectively in total market economy in different tiers of regions 1985-2004. 
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson): 0,885. 
 
rest of the regions suffer relative losses in terms of growth and transformation. During the 
second period (1994-2004), differences in growth were converging, and the strongest supply-  
driven growth force could be found in second tier regions, showing quite high aggregate 
growth. There are therefore very distinct features in the graph that identify positive relations 
between strength of the supply-driven growth and total growth in the market economies 
during the first investment cycle. As indicated by the correlations this feature is equally strong 
during both periods. 
 
Table 6. Regional growth rates in value added. Deviations from national growth rates in 
percent units. Most salient supply driven industries vs total market economy 1985-1994, 
1994-2004 and 1985-2004. 
 1985-1994  1994-2004  1985-2004  
 
Supply 
driven 
Total value 
added 
Supply 
driven 
Total value 
added 
Supply 
driven 
Total value 
added 
1st tier 86 20 -3 20 197 74 
2nd tier -19 -4 145 26 417 44 
3rd tier 78 -3 -1 6 185 6 
4th tier -31 -2 -5 -7 -90 -18 
5th tier -76 -6 -19 -14 -234 -36 
6th tier -94 -13 -69 -24 -398 -63 
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson) for period 1985-1994:0,763, 1994-2004: 0,793 and 1985-2004: 0,885. 
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Figure 7. Relation between growth rates in value added in most salient demand driven 
industries respectively in total market economy in different tiers of regions 1985-2004.  
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson): 0,289 
 
The relation between demand-driven development of the regions and aggregate (volume) 
growth for their total market economies shows a more scattered picture for the period as a 
whole (Figure 7). It indicates that demand-driven growth so far has not had the same 
important role for regional aggregate growth as has supply driven growth. Consequently, 
there are no examples of regions that have had a higher growth than the national average 
solely based on demand-driven structural change. During the first period, the relations 
between demand-driven transformation and aggregate regional growth, as indicated by Table 
7, are negative and turn strongly positive during the second period. This implies that the 
demand-driven effect is rather a complementary and lagged force in the first investment cycle.  
 
During the second period, the importance of supply-driven growth is diminished at the same 
time as a broader set of regions draw on the advantages created by a demand-driven growth. 
An analysis of the different periods (compare Tables 6 and 7) clearly show how the driving 
forces of growth start in the supply oriented part of the economy, and subsequently is 
supplemented by and shifted towards the demand-driven industries in a hierarchical order.  
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Table 7. Regional growth rates in value added. Deviations from national growth rates in 
percent units. In most salient demand driven industries vs total market economy 1985-1994, 
1994-2004 and 1985-2004. 
 1985-1994  1994-2004  1985-2004  
 
Demand 
driven 
Total value 
added 
Demand 
driven 
Total value 
added 
Demand 
driven 
Total value 
added 
1st tier -21 20 9 20 -16 74 
2nd tier -2 -4 9 26 18 44 
3rd tier 14 -3 3 6 29 6 
4th tier 16 -2 0 -7 25 -18 
5th tier 15 -6 -15 -14 -12 -36 
6th tier 0 -13 -15 -24 -34 -63 
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson) for period 1985-1994:-0,695, 1994-2004: 0,931 and 1985-2004: 0,289. 
 
The analyses show that regions which during the  first investment cycle  have the strongest 
aggregate growth in the market economy also display strong growth in the supply-driven 
industries. Development in the top tier regions is clearly characterised by this interplay 
between supply-driven and aggregate regional growth. However, regions further down the 
hierarchy are characterised by a substantially weaker economic development, and these 
regions generally show a lower supply-driven growth than the national average. As for the 
importance of demand-driven industries, there is no support for a claim that these industries 
create substantial regional economic growth ‘on their own’ during the first investment cycle. 
Rather, we have witnessed complementary forces in regions that during some of the sub 
periods also are benefiting from a strong supply-driven growth. Supply-driven transformation 
is the totally dominating force behind regional growth during the first period of the 
investment cycle. During the second period, the focus is somewhat shifted to account fo r the 
demand-driven development also. As the Swedish economy is moving into the rationalization 
phase of the technology shift now, the demand-driven industries will most likely increase in 
importance. This goes for different types of services especially, which are expected to set the 
agenda for how the future growth will be distributed regionally. 
 
 
Growth and employment 
With a background in the discussed results concerning the positive relation between structural 
transformation and regional growth, we now expand the analysis by looking at the relations 
between regional (volume) growth and job creation. Thereby, we discuss one of the 
dimensions behind the previously mentioned jobless growth thesis. Looking at Figure 8, we 
 22 
find a very strong descriptive connection between regional economic growth, measured in 
value added, and changes in the number of employees during the investigated period as a 
whole (1985-2004). The relation between the two variables appears to be almost linear. In the 
interpretation of the graph, one should keep in mind that the national average employment 
growth, which is set to zero in the graph, corresponds to a sixteen per cent increase during the 
period, equivalent to 210,000 employees. Consequently, regions performing worse than the  
national average might still have increased employment in absolute numbers. An important 
observation is though that the regions included in the fourth, fifth, and sixth tier groups on 
average displayed an absolute decrease or close to zero growth in employment during the 
period as a whole. A majority of the Swedish regions therefore displayed a development 
trajectory indicating some kind of jobless growth, or rather that the growth force in these 
regions only in the most favourable cases managed to sustain a growth level compensating for 
the jobs that have been phased out during the early stages of the investment cycle. Once 
again, primarily the top level regions concentrating on a supply-driven growth, had so far 
been accounting for the major increases in employment. 
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Figure 8. Relation between growth rates in value added in total market economy respectively 
growth in employment in different tiers of regions 1985-2004. 
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson): 0,973. 
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Table 8. Regional growth rates in value added in total market economy and growth in 
employment. Deviations from national growth rates in percent units. 1985-1994, 1994-2004 
and 1985-2004. 
 1985-1994  1994-2004  1985-2004  
 
Total value 
added Employment 
Total value 
added Employment 
Total value 
added Employment 
1st tier 20 4 20 15 74 20 
2nd tier -4 4 26 13 44 17 
3rd tier -3 3 6 5 6 9 
4th tier -2 0 -7 -6 -18 -6 
5th tier -6 -3 -14 -8 -36 -10 
6th tier -13 -6 -24 -15 -63 -20 
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson) for period 1985-1994:0,675, 1994-2004: 0,986 and 1985-2004: 0,973.  
 
Table 8 shows that the relation between employment increase and growth was weaker during 
the first period of the investment cycle (1985-1994). This period was characterised by 
decreasing employment numbers on a nationa l level. This was also true for many regions 
further down the hierarchy. In general, only the top tier regions were close to defending their 
absolute quantity in employment in the market economy as a whole. As discussed earlier, the 
earliest supply-driven growth was initialized and developed in these regions. This is also 
indicated by the positive relation at regional level between supply-driven growth and 
employment growth. Also, during the first period, otherwise marked by a substantial decrease 
in employment at a national level, there was a clear relation between regional volume growth 
and employment growth. Regions displaying strong growth, initialized by supply-driven 
industries, in general performed better than the regions with demand-driven growth did. This 
relation is easily disguised if only the national level is analysed, as the national aggregate 
effectively hides the fact that it is within a national system, and in times of drastic renewal, 
successful and renewing regions exist together with backward, slow-growth regions. Jobless 
growth in advanced and well-developed economies is uncovered and left unexplained only 
when the influence of these less-performing regions exert an overwhelming influence on 
national growth numbers. It is exactly this that characterised the early years of the first 
investment cycle of the current Swedish technology shift. 
 
During the period 1994 to 2004, the relation between regional growth and employment 
growth was further strengthened. In this period, the employment in the national market 
economy increased substantially, in absolute numbers 300,000 employees or a corresponding 
sixteen per cent. There was, however, considerable regional variation to this number. The top 
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level regions dominated the scene and combined strong volume growth with almost twice the  
growth in employment compared with the national average. These regions, to a large extent, 
still drove the national increase in employment. During this period national development was 
no longer hindered by other slow-performing regions in the system. These regions also 
showed employment increases in absolute numbers, however in most cases at a lower level 
than the top regions and the national average. But even if the relative growth levels were 
lower, the analyses point to the fact that the employment growth effects were diffused to a 
larger set of regions than was the case during the first period of the investment cycle. Also, 
the relations between different industries began to change. The demand-driven industries 
grew yet more in importance while the supply-driven ones lost some of their importance. 
Weak but positive employment effects are also discovered in the individual and general 
services that are included in the ‘other industries’ group. 
 
To sum up, the analysis points to the fact that there was a clear relation between regional 
economic transformation and employment growth during the period 1985 to 2004. In the first 
period of the investment cycle, 1985 to 1994, characterised by massive losses in employment 
on a national scale, strongly growing regions, managed to some extent to create employment 
opportunities. These replaced some of the jobs that had been phased out nationally in 
declining industries. The vibrant dynamics of the renewing regions, that is the first, second 
and third tier regions, did not however suffice to compensate for the slower growth and job 
losses in the rest of the country. During the second period of the investment cycle, 1994 to 
2004, the relation between growth and employment was further strengthened. Almost all 
regions now contributed to the positive employment growth that characterised development 
on a national scale. Even if the top level regions still dominated the development, the growth 
in other regions contributed to an absolute increase in employment numbers. The forceful top-
level growth in combination with diffusion of employment effects to a larger spectrum of 
regions made the connection between growth and employment apparent also at a national 
level. The results indicate that when the phenomenon of jobless growth is studied in correct 
time frames and with consideration to the whole spectrum of the regional system, at least 
parts of the ‘paradox’ are resolved. The relations between variables studied become clearer 
and less ambiguous. 
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Growth and regional income 
In a concluding analysis, regional mean income will be studied to see if this variable co-varies 
with the growth of regional market economies.6  A visual inspection of Figure 9 tells us that 
there is no immediate descriptive connection between total growth in the regional market 
economies and the development of mean regional incomes. Only the first and second tier 
regions show a combination of stronger growth than the national average on both parameters. 
Third tier regions display a stronger growth than the national average, but a considerably less 
favourable development in mean income, indeed it has the weakest development of regional 
incomes among all the regions’ tiers. At the beginning of the 1980s the mean income of the 
third tier region was slightly above the national average, but in 2004 this had changed to a 
situation where the regional mean income was well below national average. This weak 
development of regional mean income is somewhat surprising, especially considering the 
beneficial effects of transformation on growth and employment in the region, and considering 
how the other top level regions were more than well able to defend their positions in the 
income league from 1985.  
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Figure 9. Relation between growth rates in value added in total market economy respectively 
growth in employment in different tiers of regions 1985-2004.  
Note: Correlation coefficient (Pearson): 0,374. 
 
                                                 
6  For 1985, income is defined for earners twenty years and above. For 2004, income of work and capital for the 
same group is defined. Non-income earners are included. Population is the number of inhabitants at the end of 
the year. 
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Summing up, we see no unambiguous relationship between regional growth in the market 
economy and the development of mean income in the regions. Nor is there other evidence 
suggesting that the mean incomes in any systemic way co-vary with any of the two growth 
forces (supply- or demand-driven) that we have analysed in this paper. There are also weak 
connections between employment growth and growth in mean regional income analysed in 
this paper. There could be many explanations to the evidence presented here, for example 
share of workforce employed outside the market economy (i.e. in the public sector), 
commuting outside the regions, level of unemployment, agglomerations of non- integrated 
labour force like new immigrants and students, and above all the design and efficiency of 
regional policies towards convergence of regional income. Despite the missing linear 
connection between growth and mean income development at a regional level, there is one 
very apparent feature in the data. The forceful structural change of the Swedish economy and 
the growth in its wake, taking place mainly in the top level regions, coincided with an 
acceleration of the mean income in the first and second tier regions (compared to the national 
average). It should also be acknowledged that there are individual regions that have 
performed true ‘class travels’, where the development of mean income has been considerably 
stronger than for their colleagues in the tier. For example, in the sixth tier several regions have 
shown a relative development well in line with the most successful top level regions in terms 
of income and employment growth. How many and diverging these ‘residuals’ are remains to 
be seen in future research, and there might also be future lessons to be learned for other 
regions from such success stories.  
  
Conclusions 
The theoretical framework of this paper – based on the macro consequences of evolutionary 
theorising and a geographical systemic approach to regional development – has allowed us to 
analyse both the time lags of transformation and renewal, as well as some of the societal 
aspects of the long-term renewal process working in the capitalist economy. While large parts 
of economic life are characterised by slow-moving patterns and geographical inertia, we have 
identified clear and systemic general geographical patterns (i.e. lead- lag relationships) in the 
development of the most dynamic industries in the first investment cycle. Within such an 
analytical framework, regional within-group variations are abstracted. These time lags, though 
of course interesting in themselves, also have consequences for job creation, but less for the 
development of regional income. Probably due to central policy initiatives, income 
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development for the worst performing regions are not as bad as suggested by their so far 
sluggish renewal, aggregated growth and employment growth. Jobless growth, to the extent 
that it exists at some levels in the regional system, seems to be a spatial and time-specific 
phenomenon in a specific stage of the first part of the technology shift process. The results of 
this study should however worry policy makers and inhabitants of the regions at the bottom of 
the hierarchy. Even though national economic transformation pays off and the effects also of 
the diverging first investment cycle on welfare variables are mitigated on a lower level in the 
regional hierarchy, questions do arise concerning the sustainability of the economies in small 
and mid-sized regions. Will growth and job creation diffuse also to these regions in later 
phases of renewal, as it has done in previous technology shifts? Data indicate a slower 
regional diffusion, and thus slower regional convergence, compared with what was the case 
during the last technology shift at the beginning of the 1970s. It should be emphasised that in 
all regional tiers there are outliers, i.e. regions performing better or worse than their 
colleagues in the tier. To identify who they are and why they are performing in different ways  
is an important future research field, opening up for multi-theoretical approaches within 
suggested structural framework. The lower end of the regional system could be of specific 
interest. We believe the structural and systemic analytic framework presented here could be 
used to formulate operational scenarios, explicitly connecting capitalist creative destruction 
with policy and welfare issues. Such a broad-reaching framework is necessary to understand 
the development of regional growth, and certainly its welfare consequences over time. 
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